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Open versus Closed Competence to Tax: A Comparative
Legal Study of Municipal Taxes in Belgium and the
Netherlands
Miguel de Jonckheere*, Arjen Schep* & Anneke Monsma*
This article describes and compares the possibilities under Belgian and Dutch law for taxation by local authorities. The most striking difference is
that Belgian local authorities may decide on their own as to which taxes they wish to impose, save for interdictions imposed by law, whilst local
authorities in the Netherlands can levy only those taxes allowed by national law.
The main purpose of this study is to enquire if the differences in tax competence are as substantial as one might expect at first glance. More
specifically, the authors compare the existence, meaning and scope of some general principles and principles of tax law which are considered to limit
the municipal tax competence.
The conclusion is that the scope of some principles and even their very existence seems to be affected to a considerable degree by the extent of the
municipal tax autonomy. The Belgian open tax system has been widely constrained by general principles of tax law, that are absent or have less far
reaching consequences in the closed tax system existing in the Netherlands. Further research is needed to determine whether the authors’ findings can
be extrapolated to other Member States who are operating systems of open or closed tax competence.
1 INTRODUCTION
This article compares the different frameworks under
Belgian1 and Dutch law that permit taxation by local
authorities. The most striking difference between the
Belgian and the Dutch municipal taxation system is that
Belgium uses a so-called ‘open system’, whilst the
Netherlands applies a ‘closed system’. In Belgium, local
authorities may decide on their own as to which taxes they
wish to impose, save for restrictions imposed by law. Local
authorities in the Netherlands may levy only those taxes
that are explicitly mentioned by law. The main research
topic of this article is to determine the extent to which
this difference in fiscal autonomy influences the design,
limitations and judicial control of municipal taxes.
Section 2 describes the constitutional setting in which
Belgian and Dutch local authorities may levy taxes. The
most significant legal constraints on municipal taxation and
the monitoring of municipal taxes by the judiciary are con-
sidered, as well. Section 3 examines the distinction between
municipal taxes, destination-based levies and fees in the two
countries.2 The authors present the definitions and differences
between those categories of levies in Belgium and the
Netherlands, and seek to determine if and to what extent
these differences are influenced by the open or closed system of
taxation. Section 4 examines some of the practical conse-
quences of the divergent fiscal competences of local authorities
in Belgium and the Netherlands. Also discussed are the
control exercised by the judiciary on the municipal tax com-
petences and several constraining rules and principles. It
seems that the scope of some principles and even their very
existence is indeed considerably affected by the extent of
municipal tax autonomy.
2 MUNICIPAL COMPETENCE FOR MUNICIPAL
TAXATION IN BELGIUM AND THE
NETHERLANDS
2.1 Constitutional Setting
2.1.1 Belgium
Belgium is a federal state with a rather complex constitu-
tional system. Besides the federal state, there are three
Notes
* Full professor of Tax Law at the Faculty of Law and Criminology, VU Brussels and Professor on Taxation by Local Authorities at the Erasmus University Rotterdam from
2011 till 2015. A.W. (Arjen) Schep is postdoctoral research fellow at the Erasmus Study Centre for Taxation by Local Authorities (ESBL). Mrs. A.P. Monsma is research
fellow at the Erasmus Study Centre for Taxation by Local Authorities (ESBL). Emails: miguel.de.jonckheere@vub.be, schep@law.eur.nl and a.monsma@law.eur.nl.
1 Regarding Belgium, the allocation of competences to levy taxes and the comparison with the situation in the Netherlands based thereon takes the situation of the Flemish
local authorities as a starting point. Small differences exist as regards Walloon local authorities and local authorities in the Brussels-Capital Region.
2 In this article, fees are to be understood as payments for services rendered by the government, by which the person concerned has enjoyed a personal benefit, and whereby the
amount is in a reasonable proportion to the importance of the service performed. See s. 3.2.2 below.
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regions (the Flemish and the Walloon Region and the
Brussels-Capital Region), three language communities (the
Flemish, French andGerman community), ten provinces and
581 local authorities. The provinces and local authorities are
so-called decentralized administrations, meaning they have
proper powers and competences that in tax matters are
nevertheless subject to the administrative supervision by
the regions, which will be discussed later on amongst other
restrictions.
In principle, the Belgian local authorities are compe-
tent for everything that is of municipal interest. This
includes both matters which the local authorities them-
selves deem of municipal interest and which have not been
removed from their sphere of competence, and matters
which have been attributed to the local authorities by
higher authorities. Amongst others, their competences
are related to civil registration, population registers, pub-
lic works, social welfare, law enforcement, housing, edu-
cation, etc.
2.1.2 The Netherlands
The constitutional system of (the Kingdom of) the
Netherlands has been referred to as a decentralized, uni-
tary state. The Netherlands is regarded as one, indivisible
country, as a result of which local policies have to fit in
the policies of the country as a whole. In this concept, the
central government prevails over the twelve provinces and
the 380 local authorities. The isles of Bonaire, St Eustatius
and Saba (so-called BES-isles) have the legal status of
public entity3 (special local authority) and maintain a
specific tax system.4 The idea of decentralization entails
that some of the responsibilities of the central government
are left to other public bodies and their agencies, which
are more or less independent from the central government.
Territorial decentralization entails that provinces and local
authorities have general legislative and administrative
powers. Functional decentralization means that one or
more branches of central government issues (functions)
are left to other public bodies, such as the ‘water boards’.5
Provinces are hierarchically situated between the cen-
tral government and the local authorities. They fulfil tasks
which the central government finds hard to fulfil because
it is too big, and local authorities find hard to fulfil
because they are too small. In the Netherlands, provinces
have many competencies regarding environmental
planning.
Both the central government, the provinces, the local
authorities and the water boards have their own indepen-
dent competences to levy taxes. The taxes provinces, local
authorities and water boards can levy, are determined by
legislation that is incorporated in coordinating laws: the
Provinces Law (Provinciewet), Local Authorities Law
(Gemeentewet) and the Water Boards Law (Waterschapswet),
respectively. These laws contain both tax and non-tax
provisions.
2.1.3 Figures6
Belgium7 Netherlands8
Inhabitants 11.35
million
17.02
million
Number of local
authorities9
581 380
Total proceeds municipal
taxes
8.7 billion 9.7 billion
Proceeds per resident (EUR) 778 56510
% own levies as part of total
income
52.8% 16%
In budgetary terms, municipal levies in Belgium account
for approximately EUR 8.7 billion, or approximately
5.5% of GDP. In the Netherlands, municipal levies
amount to EUR 9.7 billion, corresponding to 1.4% of
GDP. In per capita terms, this amounts to EUR 778 for
Belgium,11 compared to EUR 565 in the Netherlands. In
Belgium, local authorities receive 52.8% of their income
Notes
3 NL: Art. 134 Grondwet (Constitution).
4 Based on the Law regarding finances of the public bodies Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (Wet financiën openbare lichamen Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba or FinBES). It
concerns, e.g., the tax on lands and surtaxes on the real estate tax (Arts 43–52); the taxes applying for tourists (Art. 53); the tax imposed on rental cars (Art. 54); a road tax
(Art. 55); parking fees (Art. 56); an advertising tax (Art. 59) and a sufferance tax (Art. 60). This article will not pay any further attention to the levies imposed by the BES-
isles in this article.
5 Dutch water boards (Dutch: waterschappen) are regional governmental bodies charged with managing water barriers, waterways, water levels, water quality and sewage
treatment in their respective regions.
6 A. Erauw & A. Dessoy, De financiële situatie van de Vlaamse/Waalse/Brusselse lokale besturen, Budget 2017, Research Belfius Bank (2017), https://research.belfius.be/nl/lokale-
financien/ (accessed 6 Feb. 2019). Dutch figures derived from Statistics Netherlands (www.cbs.nl) and C. Hoeben, J. G. de Natris, M. A. Allers & J. Veenstra, Atlas van de
lokale lasten 2018, COELO (2018), https://www.coelo.nl/images/rapporten/Coelo_Atlas_van_de_lokale_lasten_2018.pdf (accessed 6 Feb. 2019).
7 Erauw & Dessoy, supra n. 6, figures of 2017.
8 Hoeben, De Natris, Allers & Veenstra, supra n. 6, figures of 2018.
9 The local authorities and inhabitants are divided as follows: Flanders has 308 local authorities and 6.4 million inhabitants, the Brussels Capital Region consists of nineteen
local authorities and 1.1 million inhabitants, and the Walloon Region, is divided into 262 local authorities and houses 3.5 million inhabitants.
10 The average amount of municipal taxes for a multiperson household in 2018 is EUR 721. Hoeben, De Natris, Allers & Veenstra, supra n. 6.
11 Figures for the Flemish region. For the Walloon Region: EUR 697, Brussels-Capital Region EUR 996.
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from taxes; in the Netherlands, this is about 16%. Belgian
local authorities receive the majority of their tax revenues,
about 85%, from surcharges on the personal income tax
and on the property tax. Local authorities may decide only
whether they will raise surcharges, and what the levels of
these surcharges will be. Regarding the ‘own’ taxes levied
by local authorities, 30% accrues from taxes on public
cleanliness, 22% from taxes on economic activities, 21%
from ‘patrimonial taxes’,12 12% from levies on the use of
the public domain and 6% from taxes on all kinds of
administrative services. In the Netherlands, property taxes
account for 41% of municipal tax income, other taxes (for
instance parking taxes) account for 15%; sewage and
waste processing taxes account for 34%; fees for services
account for the remaining 10%.
2.2 Fiscal Competencies
2.2.1 Belgium
As mentioned above, Belgium has a so-called open system
regarding municipal taxes. The Belgian Constitution does
not, contrary to its Dutch counterpart, state that ‘the
central government decides what taxes are to be levied
by local authorities’, but instead that ‘the municipal
council regulates everything of municipal interest’13 and
that ‘no municipal tax shall be levied without a decision
to that end by the municipal council’.14 This means that
Belgian local authorities may, in principle, introduce
every kind of taxation one could think of. The only
limitations to this tax competence are the legal exceptions
introduced by federal law ‘in case of apparent necessity’,15
the regional ‘administrative supervision’16 and of course
the necessity to respect higher constitutional and interna-
tional rules and general principles of law. Thus, Belgian
local authorities may impose taxes on various economic
activities (like breweries and newspaper sales, but also
banking activities), on all kinds of movable or immovable
property (factory premises, vacant or dilapidated build-
ings, bicycles, etc.), on municipal services or on certain
aspects of wealth (swimming pools, tennis courts, etc.). As
of today, about 100 municipal taxes exist in Flanders.
A consequence of this fiscal autonomy is that although
they might bare the same name, taxes in neighbouring
local authorities can have a completely different taxable
fact, taxable person or calculation base. The fiscal auton-
omy indeed entails that every local authority decides what
they will tax, who will be liable, which exemptions will
be granted, what is the calculation basis and what are the
rates.
Besides taxes, local authorities may also levy fees on
services performed in their capacity as public authority to
persons that particularly benefit from these services.
However, the aforementioned fiscal autonomy allows
local authorities to choose between a tax or a fee, so that
fees for individual services rendered may be introduced as
a tax.17
2.2.2 The Netherlands
Compared to the open system of municipal taxation in
Belgium, the Dutch system can be described as closed.
Local authorities may levy taxes only if and to the extent
that the national legislature (defined in the Constitution
as the Cabinet and Parliament acting in concert) has given
them the power to do so.18 This means that local autho-
rities may introduce only those taxes that have been
stipulated in a law and are subsequently bound by any
restrictions set therein. Some of these restrictions will be
discussed later in this article. Twelve Dutch municipal
levies are based on the Local Authorities Law
(Gemeentewet).19 Two more municipal taxes have been
made possible by special laws.20 The taxes levied by
water boards are based on the Water Boards Law
(Waterschapswet) and the provincial taxes are based on
several laws. Local authorities violate the principle of
legality if they exceed their legally attributed competen-
cies. In that case, the contested part of the tax regulation
would be declared void.
The legal provisions usually are very brief in their
description. Because of this, Dutch local authorities
often have more freedom in drawing up their tax regula-
tions than one might first think. After the major change
in the Local Authorities Law in 1995, local authorities are
Notes
12 These include various levies, such as a tax on used building parcels, taxes on second residences, on building and on remodelling and on vacant or dilapidated buildings.
13 BE: Art. 41 Constitution, coordinated on 17 Feb. 1994.
14 BE: Art. 170, § 4 Constitution.
15 BE: Art. 170, § 4, 2° Constitution.
16 BE: Art. 162, 2de lid, 6° Constitution.
17 BE: Rb. Brussels, 30 May 2012, no. 2009/AR/1537, LRB, 2012, no. 3, 105.
18 NL: Art. 132 Constitution, in conjunction with Art. 219 Local Authorities Law (Gemeentewet).
19 These are taxes on immovable property (Art. 220-220h); taxes on movable property (Art. 221); taxes on commuting (Art. 223); a tax levied from tourists (Art. 224); parking
taxes (Art. 225); dog license taxes (Art. 226); advertising taxes (Art. 227); sufferance taxes (Art. 228); sewing charges (Art. 228a) and fees on utility, pleasure and amusement
rights (Art. 229).
20 These are the waste tax in respect of the disposal of household waste, which is levied based on the Environmental Protection Law (Wet milieubeheer), Art. 15.33, and the BIZ-
Contribution in BI-Zones (Business Investment Zones), based on the BI-Zones Law (Wet op de BI-Zones).
Intertax
470
explicitly allowed to set the tax base and rate, if not yet
laid down in this Local Authorities Law. Furthermore,
using a municipal tax or fee as a policy instrument is
allowed.
2.3 Limitation of Municipal Tax
Competences
2.3.1 Belgium
As noted, Belgian local authorities may levy any tax,
except for legal exceptions in case of apparent necessity,
restraints following administrative supervision and the
necessity to respect higher rules and principles.
2.3.1.1 Legal Exceptions in Case of Apparent
Necessity
The legal exceptions in case of apparent necessity can be
divided into three categories. The first category makes
it impossible for local authorities to levy taxes on matters
already taxed by the federal government. The most impor-
tant provision in this respect is Article 464(1) of the
Income Tax Law (Wetboek Inkomstenbelastingen), which
prohibits local authorities from raising surcharges on
the different income taxes introduced by the Income
Tax Law, or from raising similar taxes on the amount or
taxable bases of those income taxes (except for sur-
charges on the property tax). Likewise, local authorities
are also prohibited from raising surcharges or similar
taxes on matters subject to the gambling tax and to
road taxes.
The second group of exceptions to the tax competence
of local authorities prohibits taxes of a certain nature or
taxes on certain goods or services. This includes for example
the prohibition of octroy taxes,21 taxes on cattle,22 on
funeral services,23 on certain types of public
entertainment24 and on the use of the public domain by
telecom operators.25 This group also includes legal provi-
sions prescribing the gratuitousness of certain operations,
such as issuing certain administrative documents.
Finally, the third category consists of subject oriented
constraints, causing certain subjects to be exempt from all
or a limited number of municipal taxes. Examples include
b-Post (Belgian Post Services) and the Vlaamse Radio- en
Televisieomroeporganisatie (Flemish Broadcasting
Services).
It is worth mentioning that under Belgian law, legal
provisions allow local authorities to levy taxes that surpass
their constitutional tax competences i.e. to levy taxes
which they could not introduce based on their constitu-
tional competencies. One example is the municipal tax on
undeveloped building land. These provisions are the result
of the widely supported view that local authorities do not
have the power, under the Belgian Constitution, to intro-
duce taxes that lack a primarily fiscal motive, as in this
case (preventing land speculation). Without the aforemen-
tioned legal provisions, only the central or regional legis-
lature would be allowed to introduce taxes that have a
primarily non-fiscal motive.
2.3.1.2 Administrative Supervision
The constraints on municipal tax levying powers due to
the administrative supervision entail that the supervising
authority may assess whether municipal tax regulations
are in accordance with the law and with the public inter-
est. If a conflict arises, and depending on the region
concerned, the supervising authority may either nullify
the municipal tax regulations or refuse approval.
Since the state reforms of 2001, the regions are
responsible for both organizing and executing adminis-
trative supervision. As a result, the form, content and
procedure of administrative supervision differs, depend-
ing whether the local authority is part of the Flemish
Region, the Walloon Region or the Brussels Capital
Region. Whereas the administrative supervision on
municipal taxes in the Flemish and Brussels Capital
Regions takes place in the form of suspension and
nullification, the Walloon Region has chosen a mechan-
ism of supervisory approval. Regarding content, there is
also a notable difference, as in the Flemish Region a
specific definition was given to the concept of public
interest, being any interest that is of higher importance
than the local interest.26 As a result, the supervising
authority is no longer able to suspend or nullify a
municipal tax regulation based on the assessment that
the regulation would violate interests of the local
authority itself. In other regions, however, this is still
possible.
Notes
21 Octroy taxes (in Latin, vectigalia) were municipal taxes collected on various articles brought into a local authority for consumption. They were abolished by Law of 18 July
1860 (Wet van 18 juli 1860 betreffende de afschaffing van gemeentelijke octrooien, B.S 18 July 1860).
22 BE: Art. 464(2) Wetboek Inkomstenbelastingen [Income Tax Code].
23 BE: Wet van 28 januari 1975 betreffende de gemeentebelasting op het lijkenvervoer, B.S., 4 Sept. 1975 [Law of 28 Jan. 1975 concerning the municipal taxes on funeral
transport].
24 BE: Wet van 24 Dec. 1948 betreffende de gemeentelijke en provinciale financiën, B.S., 6 Jan. 1949 [Law of 24 Dec. 1948 concerning local and provincial finances].
25 BE: Wet van 21 maart 1991 betreffende de hervorming van sommige overheidsbedrijven, B.S., 27 Mar. 1991 [Law of 21 Mar. 1991 concerning the reform of certain public
enterprises].
26 BE: Art. 249 Gemeentedecreet [Local Authority Decree].
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2.3.1.3 Higher Rules and Principles
The third constraint on the municipal tax autonomy is the
necessity to respect higher rules and principles. From the
very beginning of the Belgian state, legal authors and
judges have raised questions on the reconcilability of
municipal tax levies with constitutional provisions or
with general principles of tax law. This concerns not
only principles explicitly laid down in the Belgian
Constitution (like the principle of equal treatment and
the principle of legality), but also principles derived from
the Constitution, such as the principle of territorial lim-
itation and the principle of non-retroactivity. Municipal
taxes, of course, must be in compliance with European
law. Furthermore, there are other rules and principles that
constrain municipal tax competences. In this category, one
could think of the principle of non bis in idem,27 the
principle of tax exemption for goods used for public
services, the necessity of a financial need and of a primar-
ily fiscal goal, the prohibition of taxes levied on taxable
facts that the local authority has caused itself,28 the prin-
ciple of proportionality, the principle of legal certainty
and the principle of the (internal) economic and monetary
union. These rules and principles do not only serve as an
interpretation mechanism for municipal tax regulations,
but also constrain the tax competencies of the local
authority.
In comparison with the Netherlands, it seems fair to
conclude that, because Belgian communities enjoy a very
wide fiscal autonomy, stricter constraints have also been
imposed on their competencies. Conversely, the criteria
for levies to qualify as fees, which are essential in a system
of closed tax competence such as in the Netherlands, are
far less relevant in the Belgian open system. Because of the
fiscal autonomy enjoyed by Belgian local authorities, if it
cannot be a fee… it may be levied as a tax. This topic will
be considered in section 3.
2.3.2 The Netherlands
With a system of open tax competence, as is the case in
Belgium, a series of specific prohibitions and exceptions
limiting the freedom of local authorities is necessary, as
has been discussed above. In the Netherlands, the fiscal
autonomy of local authorities is limited to an exclusive
and exhaustive description of the possible forms of taxa-
tion in the respective laws. Further legal or non-legal
restrictions on municipal tax competences are therefore
relatively rare. These additional restrictions mainly con-
cern the way in which local authorities can work out their
municipal tax regulations in more detail.
In short, the limitation of the local competence to raise
taxes in the Netherlands is threefold. First, as a conse-
quence of the closed system, local authorities are bound by
the principle of legality. Second, local authorities have to
stay within the boundaries of higher legislation (such as
laws, the Constitution and treaties) and – written and
unwritten – principles of proper legislation and good
administration (such as the principle of equality). Third,
the assessment standard may not be made directly depen-
dent of personal income, business profit or capital/wealth.
The reach of these limitations will be discussed hereafter.
The requirement that municipal tax regulations should
be approved in advance by the Crown was abolished in
1996.29
2.3.2.1 Principle of Legality and Higher Legislation
In the Netherlands, there are a number of overarching
laws for imposing and collecting tax assessments and
the forms of legal protection against them.30
Therefore, the same rules apply, regardless of whether
it concerns taxes imposed by the central government
or by local authorities.31 One important difference
between taxes imposed by the central government
and those imposed by local authorities, however, is
that regarding the former, the material tax liability
arises directly from the tax law, whilst regarding the
latter, the material tax liability may arise only when
laid down in local regulation, adopted by the legisla-
tive body of the local government (in the case of local
authorities, this is the democratically elected munici-
pal council). To be able to effectively levy a municipal
tax, a local regulation (usually one for each tax levied)
must be adopted, containing the so-called essentialia: a
description of the taxable person, the subject of taxa-
tion, the taxable fact, the assessment standard, the
rate, the starting and end date of taxation and other
relevant aspects concerning levying and collecting the
introduced tax.32
Notes
27 With all the restrictions proper to this principle, as it does not apply for taxes of different governments, deliberate exceptions etc.
28 For example no destination based tax can be levied on a sewage system built by the local authority without the necessary building permit.
29 Previous to 1996, tax regulations were subject to approval by the Crown, which gave its opinion after receiving advice from the provincial Executive Council (Gedeputeerde
Staten) and the Minister of Internal Affairs (Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties), based on NL: Art. 218-218b Local Authorities Law (Gemeentewet).
30 These are the General Administrative Law (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, Awb), the State Taxes Law (Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen, AWR) and the Collection of State Taxes
Law (de Invorderingswet 1990, Inv).
31 For local authorities, separate arrangements apply regarding certain aspects, for instance the prohibition to levy taxes based on income. This subject will discussed more
elaborately below.
32 NL: Art. 217 Local Authorities Law (Gemeentewet).
Intertax
472
Under the principle of legality, the determination of
the essentialia must stay within the boundaries set by
higher regulation and principles. Stretching out the tax
competence beyond these boundaries is not permitted and
such municipal tax regulations will be declared void in
court.
The prevailing view in Belgium that local authorities
do not have the competence to introduce a tax with a
primary non-fiscal motive, has not found a lot of support
in the Netherlands. In fact, in the latest grand revision of
the substantive municipal tax law provisions in the Dutch
Local Authorities Law, the national legislature explicitly
stated that a more instrumental approach of municipal
taxes is not only permitted, but should even be
stimulated.33 This has explicitly been laid down in the
Local Authorities Law, by stipulating that local authori-
ties are free to determine the tax bases in their municipal
tax regulation, save for explicit legal regulations or
prohibitions.34
This municipal free choice of tax base and rate is of
course, as indicated in Parliament, limited by general
principles of law, such as the principle of equality and
the principle of proportionality. Section 4.2.2 will return
to this topic.
2.3.2.2 Prohibition of Taxation Based on Ability
to Pay
Another constraint on the freedom of determination of the
tax assessment standard and rate is the legal prescription
that a municipal tax (levying standard and/or rate) may
not be based directly on income, profit or capital.35
Although Belgian municipal tax autonomy is apparently
greater, Dutch case law provides for some freedom, as
well. This will be discussed further in section 4.3.1.
3 TAXES, DESTINATION-BASED LEVIES AND
FEES
3.1 Introduction
At first glance, the difference between an open and closed
municipal tax system seems fairly simple. In a closed
system, local authorities may levy only taxes allowed by
the central legislature, while local authorities in an open
system may introduce any non-prohibited tax. The choice
for an open or closed system, however, entails other far
reaching consequences, which can be illustrated by the
relationship of taxes with fees and retributions.
3.2 Belgium
3.2.1 Legal Basis and Importance of the Distinction
The municipal competence to levy fees, rights or retribu-
tions is based on Articles 41 and 162 of the Constitution,
which empower local authorities to regulate all matters of
municipal interest, and on Article 173 of the same con-
stitution. This provision states that: ‘except for the cases
explicitly excluded by law or decree, fees may be claimed
from citizens only in the form of taxes on the benefit of
the state, the community, the region and the local
authority’.
This provision was included in the Constitution to
prevent the government from using retributions to pro-
vide itself with means without having to comply with
constitutional requirements applying on the process of
obtaining fiscal resources.36 From this provision, it can
be deduced that fees should be distinguished from taxes,
and that local authorities do have the competence to levy
fees within the scope of their municipal interest.
Furthermore, one can conclude that fees should be intro-
duced as taxes – that is, with respect of the same
Constitutional requirements, except for cases explicitly
excluded by law or decree.
This last observation immediately highlights the most
important legal consequence of the distinction between
taxes and fees or rights. Although Article 173 of the
Constitution is intended to prevent fees from being
abused to escape the constitutional fiscal requirements,
the exception still allows the federal or regional legislature
to do otherwise. Because of this, the legislature may
restrict itself to determine in which cases fees or rights
may be levied, thus leaving the other regulating issues to
the administration. The possibility that taxes are wrongly
classified as fees – and therefore the possibility of the
principle of legality being deliberately and falsely circum-
vented – remains therefore open.
In the absence of federal or regional law allowing
municipal councils to delegate parts of the essentialia of
fees to the executive authorities, this was a mainly aca-
demic observation with no real practical consequences.37
This changed with the Decree of the Flemish Parliament
Notes
33 NL: Documents of the House of Representatives 1989/1990, 21 591, no. 3, at 32–33, 65–67 en 77–78, http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl (accessed 6 Feb. 2019).
34 NL: Art. 219 (2) Local Authorities Law (Gemeentewet) as from 1995.
35 NL: Art. 219 (2) Local Authorities Law (Gemeentewet).
36 A. Alen & B. Seutin, De staatsrechtelijke verdeling van fiscale bevoegdheden, in Actuele problemen van fiscaal recht, XV postuniversitaire lessencyclus Willy Delva 1988-89, 341 (M.
Storme & S. van Crombrugge eds, Kluwer 1989); B. Peeters, De begrippen belasting, last en retributie in de artikelen 110 en 113 van de Grondwet, Rechtskundig weekblad 241,
247 (1987/1988).
37 Without delegating possibilities for fees, there is no difference in the way taxes and fees have to be decided by the municipal council.
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of 23 January 2009,38 which granted the Flemish
Municipal Councils the possibility to delegate powers for
setting the rate(s) and the collection procedures of fees to
the executive municipal authorities.39 This rule was
recently amended by a Decree of 18 May 2018, stipulat-
ing that the power to determine the exemptions or reduc-
tions of fees may not be delegated.
3.2.2 Concept of Fees
Today, fees are primarily defined as payments for services
rendered by the government, from which the person concerned
enjoys a personal benefit, and whereby the amount is in a
reasonable proportion to the importance of the performed ser-
vice. A fourth criterion of voluntary use of the service that
was set in a Royal Decree of 1819, is no longer considered
a requirement for defining a fee by the judiciary.40
The criterion that a fee has to relate to a service provided
by the government has never caused serious problems, as it
has a broad scope. It also covers the administrative services
provided by the government, like connecting a building
on the municipal sewage network, as the compensation for
non-compulsory fire interventions (like freeing a cat from
a tree). The (exclusive) use of goods in the public domain
of the local authority for the benefit of markets, fairs and
construction works, is generally also considered services
for which fees may be levied. The same applies for the use
of port infrastructure and the use of swimming pools,
sports facilities, libraries and museums.
The second condition traditionally held that the fee was
collected only following an individual service rendered to the
concerned person. The fee should, in other words, be paid
directly and immediately in return for the service enjoyed
by the concerned person, and that person must be the only
or main beneficiary of the service.41 This criterion has
evolved into the present criterion of individual benefit
from the service performed. The service may, in other
words, not mainly be beneficial to a community as a
whole. A processing plant for sewage has certain
advantages for the pollutants, but processing waste is
chiefly intended to serve the community as a whole, so
the charges paid for these services cannot be categorized as
fees.
Finally, there is the criterion of fair compensation for
the services provided, or – as stated in the Royal Decree of
1819 – that the amount of the fee may take only the
rendered services themselves in account. However, in case
law, Belgian judges appear to pay no more than lip service
to this criterion. The specific services for which a fee is
specifically asked are almost never subject to any enquiry,
and any data on the costs of these services appear to be
completely irrelevant.42
The judiciary basically limits itself to the question as to
whether it is manifestly unreasonable (marginal scrutiny)
to claim that the fee constitutes a fair compensation for
the service rendered. A typical example was the ruling of
the Supreme Court that the ‘fee for long-term parking’,
which was four times the aggregate amount of fees on
short-term parking, ‘still maintained a reasonable rela-
tionship with the rendered performance’.43
The traditional view, i.e. that the compensation may
take only the services themselves into account, is no
longer being adhered to. Many local authorities charge
different rates for the same services depending on whether
the person enjoying the service is an inhabitant of the
local authority. Furthermore, the Flemish supervising
administrative authority itself promotes the use of ‘steer-
ing and policy supporting fees by, for example, determin-
ing the rate’, and stating that ‘the cost covering criteria
for fees still allow some variations’.44
However, with regard to both the elimination of the
requirement of voluntary use and the soft interpretation
of the concept of fair compensation, the question arises
whether this lenient interpretation has not been the result
of the fact that until shortly the essentialia of both fee-
regulations and municipal tax legislation had to be deter-
mined by the municipal council. The recently introduced
possibility to transfer certain powers concerning municipal
Notes
38 BE: Art. 43, 15° Municipal Decree of 15 July 2005 (now Art. 41, 14° of the decree local administration of 22 Dec. 2017), as amended by Art. 29 of the Decree of 23 Jan.
2009, which from now on only marks the right to ‘establish the authority to levy fees and terms thereof’ as non-delegable.
39 BE: Gedr. St. Vl. P., 2008-09, no. 1946/1, 10.
40 After discussions, see e.g. the literature: C. Ketelaer, Gemeentebelastingen, TBP, 1948, 82; J. Vandenbossche, Handboek over de financiën en de comptabiliteit der gemeenten en
gemeentebedrijven 25 (West-Vlaamse School voor Bestuursrecht 1956); J. Van Der Borgt, Iets over plaatsrecht van tafels en stoelen of uitstallen van waren op de openbare weg 24–27 (T.
Gemeenteontvangers 1948); R. Wilkin, Les taxes communales 31 (Bruylant 1943); M. Bourgeois, Contribution à l’étude de la notion d’impôt en droit belge. Contours, singularité et
utilité d’un concept juridique, unpublished doctoral thesis, ULg (2007). See also case law of the Supreme Court: BE: Cass., 16 Feb. 1951, Pas., 1951, I, 390; BE: Cass., 20 Feb.
1972, T. Gem., 1973, 257; BE: Cass., 2 Feb. 1977, Pas., 1977, I, 601; BE: Cass., 20 Feb. 1986, FJF, 86; BE: Cass., 28 Jan. 1988, BE: Arr. Cass., 1987-88, 661; BE: Cass.,
19 June 1972, Pas., 1972, I, 952 and the case law of the Administrate Dispute division of the Council of State: BE: RvS 10 Dec. 1963, Arr. RvS 10320 and De Gem., 1964,
545; BE: RvS 10 May 1963, Arr. RvS 10018; BE: RvS, 8 Mar. 1973, Arr. RvS 15749; BE: RvS, 24 Mar. 1981, Arr. RvS 21061 & TBP 1981, 615.
41 J. Velaers, De Grondwet en de Raad van State afdeling wetgeving 610 (Maklu 1999).
42 A rare judgment which addresses the underlying performances is for example BE: Rb. Ghent, 17 Mar. 2009, no. 2008/AR/958 (Bruges), LRB, 2009, no. 2, 166 (‘Finally, the
plaintiff wrongly considers charges of EUR 30 disproportionate to the services provided by the government. The plaintiff has not submitted any evidence sustaining this
view. In any case, it is clear that, when services consisting of parking space are provided, it is presupposed that the government has the required land at his disposal, performs
the necessary works on infrastructure or has these works performed, provides the necessary signalling, works out regulations, commits staff to enforce those regulations, etc.
This represents a total cost, sufficiently high to justify a fee of 30 euro in return for using a parking lot in a “blue zone” for more than 2 hours’.).
43 BE: Cass., 10 Sept. 1998, no. C.97.0290.F/1 (Verviers), LRB, 1999, no. 2, 83; BE: Cass., 10 May 2002, no. C.01.0034.F (Verviers), LRB, 2002, no. 4, 224.
44 See also Circular BA-2011/01 of 10 June 2011 on the coordination of instruction on municipal taxes, B.S. 04 Sept. 2011.
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fees might well have, as a result, that the compliance rules
for fees and the control of that compliance will be tightened
in the years to come.
3.3 The Netherlands
Another consequence of the closed system of tax compe-
tences of local authorities being operated in the
Netherlands is that, in principle, the legislature has
decided whether a charge can be characterized as a general
tax or as a fee. Local authorities cannot design a tax as a
fee or a fee as a tax. With the exception of fees and taxes,
Dutch legal scholars have distinguished an intermediate
category of charges: destination based taxes.
3.3.1 Tax Categories
General taxes can be characterized as forced payments to
the local authority, whilst the local authority does not
offer any direct, individual performance in return.
Revenues go to the general funds of the local authority
and may be spent by the local authority as it sees fit.45
Fees (duties) can be distinguished from general taxes
because they are levied regarding a specific, individual
service rendered by the government, acting in its govern-
mental capacity. There are no fees due when the govern-
ment has not rendered any services. Furthermore, it is
required by law that the rates are established in such a
way that the projected benefits do not exceed the pro-
jected costs.46 The term of fees covers many levies, based
on enjoying municipal services or the use of municipal
property.47
A destination-based tax can be distinguished from a
general tax because the former entails a form of cost
recovery. The costs of certain municipal facilities are
allocated towards a group of benefiting taxable persons.
Regarding destination based taxes, the service provided by
the government does not, unlike fees, have to render any
individual profit, and does not, unlike general taxes, have
to render general profit, but it does have to render a profit
for a group.48 In this way, destination-based taxes are an
instrument of allocation: the tax burden is distributed
among those who benefit of the corresponding municipal
service (‘profit principle’) or who cause municipal costs
(‘the polluter pays-principle’). Another characteristic is
the relation between costs and the tax, which limits the
rates: the tax income may not exceed the related costs.
In the Netherlands, the legislature defines by law the
nature of a tax. Because of this, sometimes the nature of a
tax as defined by law may also change. This recently
occurred regarding sewage: previously, sewage fees were
due; now, a sewerage tax is levied, because municipal
sewage is experienced as a collective rather than as an
individual service. Moreover, as a result of the amend-
ment, the local authority can recover more costs than
before: not only costs of collecting and disposing of sew-
age, but also costs regarding the water system (ground-
water and rainwater), and replacement – and expansion
investments can be recovered because of the conversion.
If the legislature changes the character of a levy, the
side effect may be that local authorities try to off-set
the changes by using another levy. After the so-called
amusement tax was converted into an amusement fee,49
a number of local authorities started raising taxes on
staying in venues previously taxed by the amusement
tax. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that, in these
cases, local authorities were not allowed to raise an
amusement tax in disguise.50
However, a new line in case law has emerged
recently, granting an exception from the principle that
the legislature determines the character of the tax. In a
judgment about dog licenses, the Dutch Supreme Court
ruled that the local authority is free to limit a general
tax (such as dog licenses) so that the revenues are used
to meet the costs arising from keeping dogs and
affiliated facilities.51 In other words, the general tax – as
intended by the legislature – of dog licenses can be
restricted to a destination-based tax by the municipal
council itself. In this case, the local authority had
restricted the dog license tax to the built-up area of
the local authority, because only in this area had the
local authority erected facilities to counter the nuisance
of dogs (feaces).
Based on this judgment, many local authorities in the
Netherlands restricted advertising taxes to a certain area
in the local authority, as well.52 section 4.3.2 will
Notes
45 Dutch local authorities can levy the following general taxes: taxes on immovable property, taxes on movable property, commuter taxes, tourist taxes, parking taxes, dog tax,
advertising taxes and sufferance taxes.
46 NL: Art. 229b Local Authorities Law (Gemeentewet).
47 Fees levied in the Netherlands include: cleaning fees, funeral services fees, burial fees, fire department fees, fees for permits and official documents, harbour fees and market
fees.
48 Dutch destination-based taxes are the betterment levy (baatbelasting), the sewerage tax and the waste tax.
49 NL: Art. 229 (1) (c) Local Authorities Law (Gemeentewet).
50 NL: RvS, 30 Mar. 1983, no. 21.535, Belastingblad 1983, at 289; NL: RvS, 13 Jan. 1988, no. 25.129, Belastingblad 1988, at 132.
51 NL: RvS, 21 June 2000, no. 33.816, ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA6253.
52 In this case, the proceeds of advertising taxes are paid into a ‘fund’, which is managed by the entrepreneurs from whom those taxes have been levied. These entrepreneurs can
consequently use the means available for making collective investments in the area concerned. On this development, see extensively A. W. Schep, Naar evenwichtig bijzonder
kostenverhaal door gemeenten (Towards Balanced Cost Recovery by Local Authorities), dissertation Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (Kluwer 2012).
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consider territorial differentiation of taxation by local
authorities in further detail.
3.3.2 Provisions for Fees
Under Article 229 of the Local Authorities Law, fees can
be charged both for services provided by the local author-
ity and for using municipal property.
Most case law concerns the first category of service fees.
Because of the principle of legality, the local authority may
charge a service fee only if a service is provided. In the courts’
decisions, a service is defined as (i) activities not involving
the execution of public authority tasks and (ii) activities
directly and predominantly related to service delivery for a
benefit that can be individualized. As to be expected, this
definition leads to many disputes. Significant judgments
have been rendered about fees for European identity cards,
requests for public information and extra safety screening
in permit applications for escort service companies. In the
case of the delivery of a European identity card, the
Supreme Court judged it not to be predominantly in the
individual interest of the applicant, but to be in the field of
the execution of public authority tasks, as every citizen is
obliged to be able to prove his identity in case asked by the
authorities (for public safety reasons) and this European
identity card is the indicated way to do so. The delivery
of a European identity card therefore cannot be regarded
service provision.53 The same line of reasoning applies to
the providing of public information on request: in that case,
the Court held that public information itself should be free
of charge, and only the costs of the requested way of
providing (for example costs of copying) may be charged.54
Also, the special safety screening for a permit for escort
companies is considered to be the task executed by a public
authority and, thus, cannot be seen as a service delivered by
the local authority.55
A second topic in the case law on fees is the so-called
‘non-profit-rule’, expressed in Article 229b of the Local
Authorities Law. Under this provision, ‘the rate must be
determined in a way the estimated revenue of the fees won’t
exceed the estimated related costs’. In recent years, judges
have increasingly scrutinized the calculation of costs and
benefits related to the fees charged. In a number of judg-
ments, the Supreme Court has interpreted the way in which
the judicial review of the non-profit-rule should be exe-
cuted. First of all, the non-profit-rule should be applied to
the Fee Regulation as a whole and not to separate services
mentioned in the regulation. This means that cross-sub-
sidization is allowed.56 Second, the estimated costs and
benefits should be the figures mentioned in the municipal
annual budget, whereas these may be worked out later on in
detail as long as the calculation follows the municipal
budget.57 The calculation of costs and benefits must be
tested against the accounting rules for local authorities,
which contain for example rules for making provisions.58
Only attributable costs may be taken into account, those
are both direct costs of the municipal services and indirect
costs as far as they are more than marginally linked to the
service (i.e. more than 10%).59 The burden of proof is on
the local authority to demonstrate that they correctly
applied the non-profit-rule. The Supreme Court has devel-
oped a special scheme for the application of the burden of
proof in fees’ cases.60 The ultimate consequence of the local
authority’s not fulfilling the non-profit-rule can be a void-
declaration of the Fee Regulation by the court. This is the
case only if the revenue of the fees exceeded the costs by at
least 10% and the excess was obvious in advance.61 In the
case of smaller excess, the rate will be reduced by the court
itself and the assessment will be reduced accordingly.62
Last but not least, the local authority is granted a wide
competence to set the assessment standard and rate for its
fees. For example a fixed rate is allowed, as well as a
(digressive or progressive) rate dependent of the benefit
or amount of service received. For building permits, a rate
dependent on the building contract value or construction
price is allowed and also (progressive and digressive) rate
classes are allowed.63 Also instrumental use (for example
stimulating sustainability via lower rates) is accepted.64 In
the local authority of The Hague for example, a discount
on building permit fees is given in case of fulfilling
Notes
53 NL: RvS, 9 Sept. 2011, no. 10/04967, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BQ4105.
54 NL: RvS, 8 Feb. 2013, no. 12/00529, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ0693.
55 NL: RvS, 28 Oct. 2016, no. 15/05569, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:2426.
56 NL: RvS, 14 Aug. 2009, no. 43.120, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI1943.
57 NL: HR, 6 Jan. 2012, no. 10/03677, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BR0689, no. 10/03697, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BR0707 and no. 10/03676, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BR0676.
58 Ibid. See also NL: RvS, 16 Jan. 2015, no. 13/04173, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:67.
59 NL: RvS, 4 Apr. 2014, no. 12/02475, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:777.
60 NL: RvS, 24 Apr. 2009, no. 07/12961, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI1968 and NL: RvS, 4 Apr. 2014, no. 12/02475, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:777. For a nice example of applying the
scheme of the Dutch Supreme Court, see NL: Hof. Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 16 Jan. 2018, no. 16/01084, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2018:398.
61 NL: RvS, 10 Apr. 2009, no. 43.747, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BC3691 and NL: RvS, 13 Apr. 2012, no. 10/03650, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BU7248.
62 NL: RvS, 3 Nov. 1999, no. 34.616, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:AA2917.
63 NL: RvS, 30 June 2017, no. 16/05127, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:1174.
64 NL: Documents of the House of Representatives, 1989-1990, 21,591, no. 3, at 65, http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl (accessed 6 Feb. 2019).
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special sustainability standards, such as the reuse of mate-
rials and energy-neutrality.65
3.4 Conclusion
In both Belgium and the Netherlands local authorities
can, in addition to taxes, also charge fees, which are
broadly defined in both countries as charges for individual
services provided by the government. If a fee does not
meet this definition and the criteria arising from it, the
fee may be introduced as a tax in Belgium without any
problem; however this is not possible in the Dutch closed
system. In the Netherlands, local authorities have to
exactly comply with the limits laid down in the law so
that a charge will qualify as a fee; in Belgium, this is
hardly an issue. Belgian local authorities have made taxes
of a lot of retributions. Contrary to the Netherlands, in
Belgium the specific formal tax rules concerning the
levying and collecting of taxes do not apply on fees. By
turning retributions into taxes, local authorities gain
access to the formal tax legislation to assess, levy and
enforce the charges that must be paid for services
rendered.
The distinction between taxes, destination-based
taxes and fees has a different importance in both coun-
tries. In the Netherlands, there is a strict separation,
while the distinction is more flexible in Belgium.
Consequently, this leads to a difference in the judicial
review of both types of levies. It can be concluded that
the strict distinction and the differences in the review
in the Netherlands are the direct results of the closed
system, and that the higher degree of flexibility for
Belgian local authorities is the result of the open sys-
tem that applies there. Furthermore, the situation in
the Netherlands suggests that the amount of municipal
tax autonomy decreases depending on the type of levy.
The Dutch local authorities enjoy the most freedom in
determining the tax rate and the spending of the pro-
ceeds with the so-called general taxes. Next in line are
the destination-based taxes, where tax liability is linked
to group profit and where the proceeds are labelled and
must be used to cover the cost of certain facilities. For
example the proceeds of the waste tax serve to cover
only the costs of collecting and treating household
waste. The proceeds may therefore not be added to
the general funds of the local authority. When it
comes to fees, Dutch local authorities do not experience
much autonomy, as these may be levied only if the
person charged gains an individual profit from the
service performed. Moreover, the fee may not recover
more than (direct and indirect) costs associated with the
service for which the fee is being levied. The ultimate
sanction for exceeding these standards regarding desti-
nation-based taxes and fees is that the tax regulation
will be deemed (partially) void. Section 4.2 will con-
sider judicial review more in detail.
4 LOCAL FISCAL AUTHORITIES IN PRACTICE:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL
COMPETENCIES AND CONSTRAINTS ON
THESE COMPETENCIES
4.1 Introduction
This section examines the degree of legal control on
municipal taxation in both countries, as well as the
(limiting) influence of so-called general principles of
tax law on local fiscal autonomy. What consequences
do they have in countries operating either an open or
closed system of municipal tax competence? Is the
Belgian system really so open that there are hardly
any constraints on the competencies of the local autho-
rities, or, on the contrary, has the fiscal autonomy of
local authorities been limited firmly by the use of (real
or perceived) constraining principles by the judiciary?
And is the Dutch system effectively so closed that, on a
local level, there is no margin for error, or is there still
some discretionary margin for local authorities which is
less examined by the judiciary, just because of the strict
legal basis of municipal taxes?
Below, the authors first discuss how judicial control of
municipal taxation has been organized, and what exactly
the object of judicial scrutiny is. Next, they examine how
constraining rules and principles in both countries are
applied in practice.
4.2 Judicial Control of Municipal Taxation
4.2.1 Belgium
4.2.1.1 Organization of Judicial Control
As is the case in a lot of other state – and administrative
affairs, the Belgian system of judicial control of municipal
tax regulations and tax assessments is rather complicated.
Legal control mechanisms can be divided into three cate-
gories depending on the aim or scope of the control
mechanism, but also with regard to the competent jur-
isdiction. As with regards to the latter, one can distin-
guish between the competence to control the tax
regulation itself, the competence to control the tax assess-
ments and the competence to control the legal provisions
that regulate municipal taxes.
Notes
65 NL: Gemeente Den Haag, Korting op bouwleges krijgen, https://www.denhaag.nl/nl/vergunningen-en-ontheffingen/bouwvergunningen/korting-op-bouwleges-krijgen.htm
(accessed 6 Feb. 2019).
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Council of State
The Council of State (Raad van State, RvS) is the compe-
tent court for proceedings against the municipal tax reg-
ulations themselves. This concerns both the procedure to
declare municipal tax regulations void, which every inter-
ested party may invoke within sixty days following pub-
lication of the tax regulation, and appeals of the local
authorities against the annulment of a municipal tax
regulation by the supervising governmental authority.66
The Council of State nullifies a municipal tax regulation
in the event of a breach of important rules of procedure, in
case of détournement de pouvoir or when the local authorities
exceeded their powers. The annulled (part of the) regula-
tion is deemed to have never existed, so that each person
(including others than those who initiated the legal pro-
ceedings) can reclaim paid taxes. When investigating
whether local authorities have exceeded their powers, the
Council of State examines the relevant municipal tax
regulation in view of all possible higher standards, includ-
ing general principles of law, constitutional rules and
provisions of international law.
Ordinary Courts
Ordinary courts are competent for the actual tax assess-
ments based on municipal tax regulations. The following
courts are competent, in chronological order, the Courts of
First Instance (Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg, Rb.), the
Courts of Appeal (Hof van Beroep, HvB) and the Supreme
Court (Hof van Cassatie, Cass.). However, before a case can
be brought before a Court of First Instance, the taxable
person must first conduct an administrative appeal with
the Mayor and the Executive Board (College van burgemeester
en schepenen) which established the tax assessment. This
must be done within three months following the notifica-
tion of the individual tax assessment note. Within a
period of three months following the decision concerning
the administrative appeal or – if no decision was noti-
fied – after six or nine months following the administra-
tive appeal, the case may then be brought before the Court
of First Instance.
An appeal against the decision of the Court of First
Instance may be made before the Court of Appeal within
one month of the notification of the verdict of the Court
of First Instance.
Finally, the Court’s decision may be contested before
the Supreme Court. This Court investigates whether the
law has been applied correctly and whether the rules of
procedure have been complied with; it does not give
judgments on mere factual matters. Although the courts
mentioned above essentially only verify the validity of tax
assessments, a lawful tax assessment presupposes that the
tax regulation is also valid. The judicial review therefore
includes both the legality of the municipal tax assessment
and the legality of the underlying tax regulation (Article
159 of the Constitution). If a court holds either of them
unlawful, however, this concerns only the taxable person
who has contested the tax assessment; other individual tax
assessments are not affected.
Constitutional Court
Finally, Belgium also has a Constitutional Court
(Grondwettelijk Hof, GwH). Though it does not rule on
municipal tax regulations directly, it has a significant
indirect impact. After all, this Court has the power to
rule on the constitutionality of laws and decrees constrain-
ing or regulating the tax competencies of local authorities.
Consequently, the Constitutional Court is also competent
to judge whether a (given interpretation of a) constraint
on a municipal competency is consistent with the require-
ments set out in Article 170 of the Constitution.
Moreover, the Constitutional Court examines whether a
constraint on municipal competency is consistent with the
allocation of competences between the federal and regional
authorities.
Although the three courts mentioned above each have
distinct competencies on municipal taxes, all three of
them can give their views on the interpretation of a
certain legal provision affecting a tax levied by a local
authority, without one of those views being dominant
over the others. It has been shown several times in the
past that this system leads to contradicting court rulings
and lengthy discussions.
4.2.1.2 The Scope of Judicial Control Mechanisms
The scope of control mechanisms applied by the judiciary
on municipal taxation can also be divided into three cate-
gories. A first form of control concerns the individual tax
assessment.67 Second, the validity of the tax regulation is
assessed.68 Finally, a third type of legal control concerns
laws or decrees regulating the municipal tax competency.69
Reviewing Individual Tax Assessment
Themost obvious form of legal control is the one concerning a
proper application of the municipal tax regulation (and all
matters explicitly or implicitly linked to it), after an indivi-
dual tax assessment has been challenged. This is the kind of
review made during the administrative appeal. In this kind of
Notes
66 Unlike the Netherlands, municipal tax regulations in Belgium are still subject to administrative supervision, where the supervisory governmental authority is acting ‘to
prevent violations of the law or the public interest being harmed’.
67 See section Ordinary Courts.
68 This is done by all courts in Belgium (Council of State, ordinary courts and indirectly by the Constitutional Court). See s. 4.2.1.1.
69 See section Constitutional Court.
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review, the administration or the court assesses only the
actions taken by the tax authorities; it does not give its
views on an (alleged) unlawful provision in the tax regulation
itself, or on its concordance with higher norms. This involves
cases in which the administration has not applied the tax
regulation correctly (taxable situation not being present, not
granting a tax exemption where it was due, applying the
wrong levying criterion), when disagreements arise on its
interpretation (for example can a pharmacy cross-sign be
considered as a form of advertising?),70 but even cases in
which the principles of proper public administration (princi-
ple of legal certainty,71 proportionality,72 fair play)73 were not
honoured.
From a broader perspective, this control mechanism also
involves reviewing whether the tax authorities have acted in
accordance with the Constitution, fundamental principles of
tax law and other legal provisions, which must be considered
incorporated in the tax regulation unless proven otherwise.
Examples of misapplications of a municipal tax regulation
include a discrimination caused by a faulty interpretation of
the municipal tax regulation, granting an unlawful
exemption74 or applying the tax regulation on an extraterri-
torial or retroactive basis. As to the principle of equality, this
principle is for example violated when a tax on vacant
buildings is levied on involuntary vacant buildings or if
the vacancy is caused by force majeure.75 Finally, actions of
tax authorities can be assessed in light of provisions of
international law. Thus, based on the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community (EEC) Protocol on the
privileges and immunities of the EEC, taxes on second
residences cannot be levied from EU officials who reside in
Belgium, even though they do not have their main residence
in the tax levying local authority.76
Reviewing Municipal Tax Regulations
When a dispute relates to provisions in the municipal tax
regulation itself, legal control mechanisms are somewhat
different. Disputes regarding the legality of a tax regula-
tion are generally a matter for the Council of State, as
mentioned above. However, in the event of a dispute,
ordinary courts (both Courts of First Instance and Courts
of Appeal) must examine the legality of a given tax
regulation, as well – even ex officio.77 The duty to do so
arises from Article 159 of the Belgian Constitution, which
states that the courts will apply municipal decisions only
insofar as they are in accordance with the law. It is
remarkable that, here as well, appeals to the Courts of
First Instance must mandatorily be preceded by an admin-
istrative appeal to the Mayor and the Executive Board,
although the latter does not possess the competence to
judge the legality of the regulation, nor the competence to
withhold the application of (a provision in) the tax reg-
ulation because of it is unlawfulness.
Regarding its scope, the control on alleged irregula-
rities in a municipal tax regulation stretches quite far.
The whole tax regulation is scrutinized thoroughly
regarding its compliance with constitutional principles
such as the principle of equality,78 the principle of
legality79 and the principle of territoriality.80
Furthermore, the tax regulation is examined in light of
general (fiscal) principles such as the prohibition of retro-
active taxation,81 legal certainty,82 the non bis in idem
principle83 and the principle of proportionality.84
Finally, the tax regulation is reviewed in light of a
range of other principles that have been recognized in
case law regarding municipal taxes (for example the
exemption of public buildings).
Notes
70 BE: Rb. Antwerp, 20 Apr. 1999, no. 1997/BD/164 (Antwerp), LRB, 1999, no. 3, 157.
71 See e.g. the reconsideration of the board on their commitment that tax on missing parking spaces didn’t have to be paid. BE: Permanent Deputations (Best. Dep.) East-
Flanders, 1 Oct. 1998, LRB no. 4.
72 See e.g. the taxing of a starting company for the whole year and not in proportion to the activity in the starting year. BE: Rb. Antwerp, 5 Oct. 1999, LRB, 1999, no. 4.
73 See e.g. submitting an incomplete administrative file, BE: Rb. Brussels, 15 Jan. 2008, LRB, 2008, no. 2, 93.
74 BE: Rb. Hasselt, 12 Sept. 2007, no. 02/1457/A (Diepenbeek), LRB, 2008, no. 1, 24.
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77 Ex officio, so without it being raised by one of the involved parties.
78 See e.g. the justification of a tax that only affects banking concerns. BE: Rb. Ghent, 20 Nov. 2012, no. 2012/AR/2487.
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Rb. Antwerp, 15 Mar. 2011, no. 2009/AR/2248 (Overpelt), LRB, 2011, no. 4.
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82 See e.g. BE: Rb. Mons, 5 Nov. 2003, LRB, 2004, no. 4 (regarding the minimum quantity of non-commercial texts a commercial magazine must contain to be exempt from
tax).
83 BE: Rb. Bruges, 4 Jan. 2010, no. 09/694/A (Province West Flanders), LRB, 2011, no. 1, 24 (provincial and municipal tax on secondary residences; BE: Rb. Antwerp, 7 Dec.
2010, no. 1998/BD/13 (Brasschaat), LRB, 2011, no. 4 (renewal of sewerage); BE: Cass., 11 Mar. 2011, no. F 10.0004.N (Antwerp), LRB, 2011, no. 4 (revocation and
revaluation).
84 See BE: Rb. Liège, 20 June 2001, LRB 2001, no. 4 regarding joint and several liability imposed on a tenant.
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Because, as a rule, the Belgian local authorities are
competent on fiscal matters, the courts will not examine
whether a municipal tax regulation falls within the
attributed competences of this local authority, but will
examine if the given municipal tax regulation conflicts
with (a limited number of) constraining provisions.
Judicial review of municipal tax regulations in Belgium
is therefore less focused on compliance with the law, and
more on possible conflicts with constitutional provisions
and general principles.
As a consequence, taxpayers in Belgium are still less
inclined to examine municipal tax regulations in the light
of international standards, although the number of tax
disputes integrating European law is gradually increasing
in the last years. Although there certainly are some cases
in which the municipal tax regulation was held to be
conflicting with rules of international85 or European
law86 (of course, there are cases as well in which there
was no conflict),87 this is relatively rare, especially com-
pared to the large number of procedures related to the
compliance of municipal tax regulations as to national
law.
Examining Authorizing or Constraining Provisions
A final type of judicial supervision concerns the super-
vision on provisions depriving local authorities of fiscal
competencies. The Constitutional Court examines laws,
decrees and ordinances in light of the competence issues,
rights and freedoms as set out in the Constitution, and a
number of other constitutional provisions, such as the
principle of fiscal legality. Laws and decrees that restrict
or regulate the municipal tax authority can therefore be
properly assessed and be held (un)lawful.
For example the Constitutional Court handed down a
judgment regarding whether a certain interpretation of
Article 464 of the Income Tax Code (Wetboek
Inkomstenbelastingen) was reconcilable with the constitutional
principle of equality. This Article prohibits local authorities
from levying taxes on a basis similar to that of the income
tax. According to the contested interpretation, Article 464
contained a prohibition to tax any activity based on gross
profit, except for displays and entertainment. The
Constitutional Court ruled that such an interpretation was
discriminatory.88 However, no discrimination could be
found in the fact that local authorities have to pay for
collecting the additional municipal tax on the person’s
income tax, whereas regions were not held to do so for the
same service.89 More recently, the Constitutional Court
ruled that the interpretation according to which mobile
network operators were exempt from all municipal taxes
conflicts with the constitutional provision stating that the
legislature may limit municipal tax authority only in the
case of apparent necessity.90
The Constitutional Court has, in many cases, not
restricted itself to the answer as to whether a given inter-
pretation violates the Constitution. If such a violation is
ascertained, the Court usually presents an ‘alternative
interpretation’ that does not violate the Constitution.91
Just as in the Netherlands, the Belgian Court of First
Instances and Courts of Appeal can review tax provisions
in respect of international law. However, cases in which a
provision regulating municipal tax competencies is held
to be in conflict with international law are scarce. One
example is the ruling of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) that a calculating method regarding the additional
municipal tax on the persons income tax (aanvullende
gemeentelijke personenbelasting (AGPB)) was in conflict with
European law, because the additional tax was levied on
dividends for non-residents, which was not the case for
residents (who paid only a withholding tax).92
4.2.2 The Netherlands
4.2.2.1 Organization of Judicial
Control Mechanisms
Dutch (procedural) tax law provisions are laid down in a
number of uniform laws, which apply for both taxes levied
by the state and those levied by local authorities. In the
Netherlands, tax law is considered to be a special part of
administrative law. Therefore, provisions of procedural
administrative law have been standardized as much as
possible. Just as substantive tax law, procedural tax law
can be characterized as a closed system. In short, an
administrative appeal and an appeal before court regard-
ing an individual tax assessment are possible only if the
type of tax assessment concerned has been listed in a law.
Notes
85 See e.g. the conflict between a tax on incoming flight passengers with the Treaty of Chicago on Civil Aviation. BE: RvS, 3 May 2005, no. 144.081 (Zaventem), LRB, 2005,
no. 3, 207.
86 See e.g. the conflict of tax on satellite dishes with the freedom to provide services: BE: ECJ, 29 Nov. 2001, Case C-17/00, De Coster, ECLI:EU:C:2001:651.
87 See e.g. the alleged conflict between tax on mobile telephone base stations and the European freedom to provide services. BE: ECJ, 8 Sept. 2005, Case C-544/03, Mobistar and
Belgacom Mobile, ECLI:EU:C:2005:518.
88 BE: GwH, 16 Feb. 2012, no. 2012/19.
89 BE: GwH, 4 Mar. 2008, no. 44/2008 (Flemish Region), LRB, 2008, no. 1, 41; BE: GwH, 31 July 2008, no. 118/2008, LRB, 2008, no. 4, 257.
90 BE: GwH, 15 Dec. 2011, no. 2011/189.
91 BE: GwH, 22 July 2004, no. 134/2004, LRB, 2004, no. 4, 265; BE: GwH, 6 Nov. 2008, no. 155/2008, LRB, 2009, no. 1, 69; BE: GwH, 15 Dec. 2011, no. 2011/189; BE:
GwH, 16 Feb. 2012, no. 2012/19.
92 BE: ECJ, 1 July 2010, Case C-233/09, Dijkman and Dijkman-Lavaleije, ECLI:EU:C:2010:397.
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Legal proceedings start by means of an administrative
appeal. The procedure has to be initiated within six weeks
of the imposing date of the individual tax assessment and
is handled by the authority that imposed the tax assess-
ment itself. The tax levying officer of the local authority is
therefore the competent authority regarding municipal
taxes. After an administrative appeal has been completed,
parties may decide to continue legal proceedings at a
Court of First Instance (once again within six weeks).
After that, parties may decide to address a Court of
Appeal and, finally, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge
Raad) at The Hague. The Supreme Court examines only
whether the Court of Appeal judgment is sufficiently
justified and/or conflicts with standing jurisprudence; it
therefore does not render a judgment on mere factual
matters. Tax law procedures are usually treated by specia-
lized tax chambers.
Currently, there are eleven courts of First Instance
(Rechtbank, District Court)93 in the Netherlands and four
courts of Appeal (Gerechtshof, Hof.),94 each with their own
jurisdiction.95 Regarding municipal taxes, the compe-
tency of a given Court depends on the location of the
tax levying authority and, therefore the local authority
concerned. In the Netherlands there is, contrary to
Belgium, no Constitutional Court. This is partly because
of the prohibition laid down in the Constitution to test
laws against the Constitution (see section 4.2.2.2).
The aforementioned courts have no jurisdiction to
review decrees and ordinances in a direct procedure; they
are non-contestable and are exempt from an independent
appeal.96 Therefore, one could argue that the legality of
tax laws and decrees is not assessed directly. This, how-
ever, is overcome by permitting the judiciary review the
tax assessment. In the legal proceeding against the tax
assessment, the legality of the tax laws and decrees on
which the assessment is based, can be questioned and will
thus be tested by the judge.
4.2.2.2 Scope of Judicial Review
Regarding judicial review of municipal taxes, three con-
trol mechanisms can be distinguished, namely (i) review-
ing the legality of tax laws, (ii) reviewing the legality of a
municipal tax regulation and (iii) reviewing the execution
of a municipal tax regulation.
The third control mechanism features two aspects: on
the one hand, the court examines whether the tax
assessment is consistent with the tax regulation; on the
other hand, the court investigates if general principles of
proper administration have been respected. This combina-
tion of a closed system of municipal taxation, a closed
system of judicial review, the inability to examine the
constitutionality of laws and decrees directly and the
absence of preventive supervision means that the validity
of (i) tax laws and (ii) municipal tax regulations may be
reviewed only in a dispute regarding a specific tax assess-
ment, based on the municipal tax regulation concerned
(which, in term, is based on an authorizing tax law). The
meaning of each control mechanism is considered in more
detail below.
Examining Tax Laws
Courts are limited in their possibilities to examine the law. It
is up to the legislature to draft laws and up to the courts to
give rulings based upon those laws. Courts may therefore not
assess the intrinsic value or fairness of the law.97 Moreover, as
mentioned above, in the Netherlands, courts are not allowed
to examine whether laws and international treaties are in
accordance with the Constitution. For the sake of complete-
ness, bear in mind that this does not apply to subordinate
legislation such as municipal tax regulations (see section
Examining Municipal Tax Regulations). However, this
impossibility can largely be circumvented by testing out
laws against norms that outrank laws, such as human rights
treaties, as many of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution have also been laid down in international trea-
ties. For example the principle of equality (Article 1 of the
Dutch Constitution) is guaranteed as well by the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, Article 14) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR Article 26). Dutch courts are authorized to review
laws in light of these treaty provisions. Finally, laws may be
reviewed in light of unwritten general principles of law.
If a provision in a law is declared void, that provision
can no longer be applied. Any subordinate legislation
based on it will share its fate, effective immediately after
the court’s judgment. After all, the legal basis for the
subordinate legislation no longer exists (in part or in
whole). Decisions taken by public authorities and indivi-
dual tax assessments remain legally binding, unless a
procedure of administrative appeal or a procedure at a
court of first instance is still pending. Local authorities
may, of course, decide for themselves to repay the damage.
A striking example of courts examining laws in light of
treaties is the following. The National Law on Assessment
Notes
93 From 1 Apr. 2013 these are the judicial districts Amsterdam, Den Haag, Limburg, Midden-Nederland, Noord-Holland, Noord-Nederland, Oost-Brabant, Overijssel,
Gelderland, Rotterdam and Zeeland-Wet-Brabant.
94 From 1 Jan. 2013 these are the courts of Amsterdam, Arnhem-Leeuwarden,’s-Hertogenbosch and Den Haag.
95 In 2013, several judicial districts were merged, so they’ve become larger than before.
96 NL: Art. 8:2, in conjunction with Art. 7:1 Awb [General Administrative Law Act].
97 NL: Art. 11 Wet algemene bepalingen [General Provisions Law].
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of Real Estate (Wet waardering onroerende zaken, WOZ); the
tax assessment, as a WOZ-beschikking, used to contain a
threshold for taxpayers seeking administrative appeal.
This meant that the valuation was considered to be estab-
lished correctly if the difference with the actual value fell
within certain, preset ranges. This meant that small valua-
tion differences could not lead to a revision of the valua-
tion of immovable property. The local authority did have
discretionary powers to reduce the value of the property
concerned, but this could not be enforced by taxpayers.
The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that this system consti-
tuted a breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the
ECHR.98 More specifically, the provision was judged to
be conflicting with the ‘principle of lawfulness’, because it
firmly prevented taxpayers from challenging the legality
of the WOZ-beschikking, while this assessment created the
levying criterion for a number of taxes. Therefore, the
Supreme Court urged local authorities and courts to set
the threshold aside.99
Limitations by European or international law may be
derived only from legally binding provisions in treaties
and resolutions of international organizations,100 as long
as the application of these provisions is assured in a
sufficiently clear and precise manner and the provisions
assign rights to individuals. The European Charter of
Local Self-Government (signed by the Member States of
the Council of Europe) cannot be classified as such accord-
ing to Dutch courts. The Administrative Jurisdiction
Division of the Council of State stated, in the first place,
that the Dutch government explicitly made a reservation
for some of the provisions of the Charter when signing.
And second, they judged that the provisions in the
Charter are not sufficiently clear and precise enough to
be able to assign specific rights to the taxpayer.101 The
Dutch Administrative High Court ruled that, assuming
the provisions were binding, a violation would not be
easily proven, as the provisions leave a certain space for
the legislature to implement regulations for local
authorities.102
Regarding municipal taxation, a remarkable proceeding
was conducted against the state by the Association of
Netherlands Local Authorities (Vereniging van
Nederlandse Gemeenten).103 The Dutch government had
abolished the property tax on dwellings levied on resi-
dents and restricted the annual rate increase of remaining
property taxes. VNG argued this abolition to be a breach
against Article 9 of the Charter of Local Self-Government,
as it constrains the power of raising tax income and
hinders local authorities from obtaining a substantial
and significant part of their own revenue by imposing
municipal taxes. The District Court of The Hague
declined these objections, by judging that Article 9 of
the Charter is not legally binding on the Dutch state, as it
is formulated in a generic way and not unreservedly
applicable as objective law in the Dutch legal order.
Examining Municipal Tax Regulations
The provision that courts are not allowed to test out laws
against the Constitution (see section Examining Tax Laws;
hereinafter the examining ban) does not apply to municipal
tax regulations.Whilst the Dutch Local Authorities Law itself
may not be tested out against the Dutch Constitution,104
there is no examining ban on testing out municipal
regulations.105 Furthermore, regulations may, just like laws,
be reviewed in light of treaties and general principles of law.
If a court voids a (provision of a) municipal tax regulation,
this officially affects only the disputed individual tax assess-
ment itself. The tax assessment will consequently be reduced
or voided, depending on whether the regulation is consid-
ered non-binding in whole or in part. The verdict has no
direct effect on third parties or other taxable persons; other
tax assessments that are based on the voided municipal tax
regulation and have gained legal force, remain valid. Other
taxpayers may claim the ineffectiveness of the municipal tax
regulation only if they initiate (administrative) appeal them-
selves. However, there are also examples of case law in which
taxpayers enforced ex officio reduction or voiding of tax
assessments based on evidently unbinding tax regulations
although the assessments had gained legal force.106
Notes
98 NL: RvS, 22 Oct. 2010, no. 08/02324, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL1943. See also A. P. Monsma, Ontwikkelingen op het gebied van de lokale belastingen, Weekblad fiscaal recht 214
(2011); A. P. Monsma & M. J. M. de Jonckheere, Nederlandse bezwaardrempel in strijd met Europees eigendomsrecht, Lokale & Regionale Belastingen 1 (2012).
99 For a comprehensive analysis of reviewing Dutch and Belgian municipal taxes against the European right of property, see A. P. Monsma & M. Delanote, Lokale belastingen en
het Europese eigendomsrecht, in Jaarboek lokale en regionale belastingen 2011-2012 179–212 (Die Keure 2013).
100 NL: Art. 94 Grondwet (Constitution). The same applies to European Directives. See ECJ case law: NL: ECJ, 5 Feb. 1963, Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos/Administratie der
Belastingen, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; IT: ECJ, 22 June 1989, Case C-103/88, Fratelli Costanzo v. Comune di Milano, ECLI:EU:C:1989:256.
101 See Dutch case law: NL: RvS, 29 July 2011, no. 201011757/14/R1, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BR4025; NL: RvS, 7 Dec. 2011, no. 201107071/1/H1, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:
BU7093; NL: RvS, 2 May 2012, no. 201105967/1/R1, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BW4561; NL: RvS, 30 Aug. 2017, no. 201700214/1/A1 and 201609961/1/A1, ECLI:NL:
RVS:2017:2318 and 2331. See also NL: RvS, 25 Sept. 2002, no. 200101205/1 and 200102037/1, ECLI:NL:RVS:2002:AE7993 (regarding water authorities: according to
the judge they are excluded from application under the reservation made by the Dutch government when signing the Charter).
102 See Dutch case law: NL: Centrale Raad van Beroep (CRB)[Central Board of Appeal], 8 July 2013, no. 12-1381 WWB, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2013:CA4026; NL: CRB, 9 Feb.
2017, no. 15/2638 WSW, no. 15/2641 WSW, no. 15/2640 WSW, no. 15/2642 WSW and no. 15/6878 WSW, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2017:480, 481, 484, 486 and 487.
103 NL: Rb. The Hague 18 Apr. 2007, no. 262391 – HA ZA 06-1068, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BA3438.
104 See e.g. NL: RvS, 12 May 1999, no. 33.286, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:AA2760.
105 See e.g. NL: RvS, 20 Sept. 1995, no. 30.567, ECLI:NL:HR:1995:AA3102.
106 NL: RvS, 8 July 1993, no. 15.028, NJ 1995, 73 (Pollution levy decree of water board Limburg), J. A. Monsma, Toetsing van belastingverordeningen en gemeentelijke autonomie,
dissertation Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 130–31 (Kluwer 1999).
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Concerning local regulations, the method of review is
twofold. First, courts examine whether the regulation
concerned complies with authorizing provisions laid
down in a law (legality test). Second, if and to the extent
that local authorities enjoy autonomy in applying the
levy, the choices made are reviewed in light of higher
norms, including general principles of proper legislation.
This will be explained more in detail below.
Principle of Legality
Due to the ‘closed’ system, a municipal tax regulation will
be declared void if the local authority exceeds their legis-
lative power given by the corresponding law. One exam-
ple is expanding the dog license fee so as to include cats,
but there are countless other examples.107
Higher Norms
Local authorities have the freedom to choose the so-called
essentialia (such as the taxable person and the taxable object)
of a municipal tax themselves. This applies in particular
since 1995 regarding the levying criteria and the tax rate.
Local authorities may decide upon these issues for them-
selves, unless the solution chosen by a local authority con-
flicts with the Constitution, with a Law, with general
principles of law or with the prohibition to levy municipal
taxes based on income.108 This is the so-called new freedom
of local authorities, as mentioned above. Case law shows that
courts test out decisionsmade by local authorities against the
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech,109 against
the principles of equality and proportionality,110 and against
various treaties111 and human rights.112
Examining the Application of Municipal Tax
Regulations
In addition to testing out tax regulations and laws against
higher norms, courts can also examine the correct applica-
tion of a tax regulation. The consequences of a court’s
ruling that the regulation has not been executed correctly
are limited to the disputed tax assessment itself. The court
will reduce the assessment concerned or declare it void, on
the same basis as mentioned above.
The most common form of judicial review looks to
whether the amount of tax payable has been calculated
correctly (in accordance with the provisions in the regula-
tion). If, for example, different rates apply for different
taxpayers, taxable events or taxable objects within one
regulation, courts may investigate if the correct rate has
been applied. An example is a different rate for single and
multi-person households in the waste disposal tax.
Furthermore, the application of the municipal tax reg-
ulation by the levying officer may be tested against gen-
eral principles of good administration. Possible yardsticks
are the principle of equality,113 the majority-rule as ela-
boration of the principle of equality, the principle of
legitimate expectations114 and the principle of carefulness
or the principle of fair play.115
4.3 THE APPLICATION OF COMPETENCE
CONSTRAINING PRINCIPLES
4.3.1 Interpretation of Legislative Provisions:
Taxation Based on Income
In order to assess the local fiscal autonomy, one also has to look
at the application of rules and principles that may limit the
competence of local authorities. An open system, in which
exceptions to the leeway of fiscal competence are relatively
comprehensive, does not necessarily have to be more autono-
mous than a closed system, where a broad interpretation of the
taxes exhaustively described by law is accepted.
It is noteworthy in this context, for example, whether
and to what extent local authorities in Belgium and the
Netherlands may levy taxes on income, revenue or gross
profit. As for taxes on income, legislative provisions are
fairly clear. Article 464(1) of the Belgian Income Tax
Notes
107 Like the forbidden expansion of advertising tax to objects on which advertisements are attached instead of the advertisement itself (NL: RvS, 7 Oct. 1998, no. 33.553, ECLI:
NL:HR:1998:AA2314), betterment levy for other ‘facilities’ than meant by the legislature (NL: RvS, 8 Aug. 2003, nos. 36.766, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE2298, 36.769, ECLI:
NL:HR:2003:AE2304, 36.777, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE2310, 36.778, ECLI: NL: HR:2003: AE2312, 36.779, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE2313) and fees for activities that do
not qualify as ‘service’ (see s. 3.3.2).
108 NL: Art. 219 (2) Local Authorities Act.
109 NL: Hof. Amsterdam, 21 Nov. 2000, no. 98/3076, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2000:AA9105.
110 See e.g. NL: RvS, 10 Dec. 2004, nos. 36.776, 36.804, 37.041, 38.291, 38.292 and 39.178, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AF7505, AF7508, AF7514, AR7336 and AF7523; NL: RvS,
13 May 2005, no. 38.402, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AF7525; NL: RvS, 2 Dec. 2005, nos. 39.273 and 39.275, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AU7345.
111 For example, NL: Rb. Zutphen 12 Aug. 2009, no. 07/1879, ECLI:NL:RBZUT:BJ5438 (Switzerland–Netherlands treaty for avoiding double taxation); NL: RvS, 10 July
2009, no. 42.475, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BG5918 (Art. 49 Treaty of the EU and two European Directives); NL: RvS, 6 June 2008, no. 41.769, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD3159
(NATO Status Treaty, diplomatic exemptions).
112 For example, NL: Hof. Leeuwarden, 4 July 2008, no. BK-80/07, ECLI:NL:GHLEE:BD6626 (principle of equality Art. 14 ECHR); NL: RvS, 29 Oct. 2010, no. 09/02654,
ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM9232 (European right of property, Art. 1 First Protocol ECHR) after PL: ECtHR, 22 Feb. 2005 & 19 June 2006 (Grand Chamber), no. 35014/97,
Hutten-Czapska/Poland.
113 NL: RvS, 17 June 1992, no. 26.777 & 27.048, BNB 1992/294 en 295 (property tax); NL: RvS, 13 July 2012, no. 11/00162, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BV0264 (declaration taxes
like the amusement retribution in Amsterdam) and NL: Hof. Leeuwarden, 9 Mar. 2001, no. 00/00537, Belastingblad 2001, at 557, LJN: ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2001:AB0521
(parking tax, arbitrary assessment).
114 NL: Rb. Amsterdam 28 July 2005, no. 05/553, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2005:AU2493 (cleaning fee rate).
115 NL: Rb. Haarlem 17 Aug. 2011, no. AWB 10/7050, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2011:BU6938 (building permit fee rate).
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Code prohibits local authorities and provinces to levy
supplementary tax on the various income taxes. It also
prohibits levying similar taxes on the taxable base or on
the sum of income taxes, except for income from immo-
vable property. However, local authorities may levy an
additional municipal tax on the person’s income tax
(AGPB). As for the Netherlands one has to look at
Article 219(2) of the Dutch Local Authorities Law
(Gemeentewet). This provision states that municipal taxes
may be levied upon criteria (assessment standards)116
determined in tax regulations, provided the tax will not
directly depend on income, profit or capital. Dutch local
authorities may therefore determine their own levying
standards and rate, as long as they are not based on the
financial capacity of the taxpayer directly. Tax standards
relating more indirectly to income, profit or capital, such
as the market value of immovable property for example,
are not prohibited.
As a result, it is impossible in both countries to levy
municipal taxes based on the amount upon which the
national income tax is calculated. With regard to the
question if local authorities may levy taxes on gross profit,
both countries seem to have differing case law.
4.3.1.1 Case Law in Belgium
The question as to whether the legal prohibition in the
aforementioned Article 464(1) of the Income Tax Code also
includes a ban on levying municipal taxes based on revenue
or gross profit was not raised in Belgium until recently.
Until the mid-1990s, only one indirect decision from the
Council of State (RvS) can be found on this issue, concerning
a municipal tax on chip shops. The Council of State decided
that ‘as neither the gross profit, nor the amount of due
income tax was taken into account, the prohibition provision
of the Income Tax Code was not violated’.117 Yet, local
authorities did not refrain from levying taxes on displays
and entertainment as they had always done in the past, i.e. as
an indirect tax based on the sum of gross revenue.
Due to a number of quick successive rulings and judg-
ments by the turn of the millennium, the stance was quite
suddenly taken that Article 464(1) of the Income Tax
Code also prohibited levying municipal taxes on gross
profit. The judiciary decided that a municipal tax based
on the prices charged by exploiters of parking lots,118 as
well as the taxation of hotel rooms based on a percentage
of the gross income of their rental,119 and the levied taxes
on displays and entertainment based on revenue,120 all
were in conflict with Article 464 of the Income Tax Code.
The reasoning was that realized revenue is an essential
part of the person and corporate income tax, and therefore
should fall under the legal prohibition as intended by the
legislature. While there were still some proponents in
both legal doctrine121 and jurisprudence122 that specifi-
cally believed it should be possible to levy municipal taxes
on displays and entertainment based on admission fees,
the argument seemed to have been settled by a judgment
of the Supreme Court on 10 December 2009. After all, at
that time, both the Council of State and the Supreme
Court had made pronouncements indicating that they
were in favour of the view that Article 464(1) of the
Income Tax Code prohibited municipal taxes on gross
profits. This included the prohibition of taxation on dis-
plays and entertainment based on admission fees.123
Since then, the legal debate seems to have heated, as the
Council of State revoked its earlier view. In a verdict on
12 January 2010124 it stated that it should be possible for
local authorities to base a tax on displays and entertain-
ment specifically (and exclusively) on entrance fees. In
reply to the inevitable question about the reconcilability
of this interpretation of Article 464(1) of the Income Tax
Code with the principle of equality, the Constitutional
Court decided on 16 February 2012 that the interpreta-
tion given by the Council of State violated the principle of
equality. However, in their own interpretation of Article
464(1) of the Income Tax Code, the Constitutional Court
expressed that the prohibition clause covers only ‘the final
amount on which the income taxes are calculated’. This
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117 NL: RvS, 8 Feb. 1993, FJF, 93/126.
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29 (2008); V. Sepulchre, Taxes locales sur les spectacle’s, Rev.dr.commun. 92–99 (2010).
122 BE: Rb. Antwerp, 25 May 2004, no. 2003/AR/1333 (Antwerp), LRB, 2004, 193; BE: Rb. Bruges, 2 Nov. 2004, TFR, 2006, 632 with a note by E. van Dooren. See also BE:
Rb. Liège, 26 Oct. 2005, Rev.dr.commun., 2008, 18.
123 BE: RvS, 22 May 2008, no. 183.202; Cass. 10 Dec. 2009, no. F080041.
124 BE: RvS, 12 Jan. 2010, no. 199.454. See also BE: RvS, 12 Jan. 2010, no. 199.455.
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interpretation leaves room to levy municipal tax based on
gross income for every economic activity.
Thus, the top three Belgian courts of law take a differ-
ent view on the interpretation of the most significant
competence constraint on municipal tax autonomy,
namely Article 464(1) of the Income Tax Code. Several
recent decisions show that the Supreme Court retains its
earlier point of view,125 to which most Courts of Appeal
adhere.
4.3.1.2 Case Law in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands the prohibition against the levy of
municipal taxes based on tax-bearing capacity appears
to be interpreted – primarily – restrictively, as it does
not prevent local authorities from calculating taxes on
gross profit. The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad)
ruled that a tourist tax levied as a percentage of the
nightly rate, was not in conflict with the ban on a
charge based on financial capacity. The Dutch
Supreme Court held that the used assessment standard
was indeed an objective criterion that did not have
more than an indirect connection to the income of the
guest or profitability of the hotel. Therefore, no pro-
hibited differentiation to income, profit or capital, as
referred to in Article 219(2) of the Dutch Local
Authorities Law, was made.126 A tax for the use of
public ground on behalf of gas stations calculated on
the quantity of sold gas was also found not to be in
conflict with the prohibition to levy municipal taxes
based on financial capacity, according to the Dutch
Supreme Court.127 The Advocate General concluded
that the connection between gross revenue and income
or profit is of a too indirect nature, to be considered in
violation with the prohibition to levy taxes based on
tax bearing capacity. Also, setting the market value of
immovable property as a taxing standard for municipal
levies like the sewerage levy128 and the commuter
tax129 is permitted.
4.3.1.3 Conclusion: Income-Based Taxes
Both the Netherlands and Belgium have restrictions
regarding levying municipal taxes based on income, rev-
enue and/or gross profit. Remarkably, the closed Dutch
system seems more flexible than the open Belgian regime.
In Dutch case law, a distinction is made between a direct
and indirect connection with income or profit. No conflict
with the prohibition to levy taxes based on financial
capacity exists if a levy is based on the gross profit, like
the tourist tax founded on a percentage of the price of
accommodation. In Belgium however, such a levy is con-
sidered to be in violation of the prohibition.
The authors believe that this is caused by a wider reach
of the principle of equality in the Belgian open system,
where the possibility for a tax on gross profit for a specific
group would immediately trigger the question concerning
similar taxes for other groups. In the Netherlands, the
principle of equality does not reach further than the levy
in dispute. A legal judgment about a possible conflict
with tourist tax and the principle of equality affects only
that type of tax. As for this subject, a broader fiscal
autonomy therefore exists for Dutch local authorities as
opposed to Belgian local authorities. Another reason for
the more restrictive Belgian point of view, is that the
combination of a possibility to tax gross profit with an
open tax system that allows every imaginable tax, would
indeed easily allow the interdiction to levy taxes on
income to be completely eroded. It would indeed not be
that hard to turn a combination of taxes on gross profit
into taxes on net profit using tax rates that reflect the
gross/net ratio.
4.3.2 The Interpretation of Constitutional
Rules: Equality and Differentiation
Within Local Authorities
In both Belgium and the Netherlands, it is possible for
local authorities to limit the territorial scope of their
taxation. Tax is then due only in a certain part of the
local authority or the amount of the tax differs among
areas of the local authority. The principle of equality
plays a central role in this territorial delimitation.
When tax or more tax is due in a particular part of
the local authority than in another part, a violation of
the principle of equality arises. Territorial tax differentia-
tion therefore is permitted only when an objective and
reasonable justification exists. The open and closed
municipal tax systems in Belgium and the Netherlands
may account for the difference in meaning and conse-
quences of the principle of equality that can be observed
in both countries.130
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4.3.2.1 Territorial Differentiation in Belgium
In Belgian law, the fiscal principle of equality is
phrased as follows: ‘no privileges with regard to taxes
shall be introduced’.131 This abstract description has
been clarified in literature and by the judiciary: ‘The
constitutional rules of equality and non-discrimination
does not rule out a difference in treatment between
certain categories of people, as long as that difference
is based on objective and reasonable criteria. When
assessing the existence of such a justification, one has
to take into account the purpose and consequences of
the disputed provision, as well as the nature of the
principles in question. The principle of equality is
violated when there is no reasonable and proportional
connection between the applied resources and intended
goal’.132 Marginal scrutiny is used when testing muni-
cipal taxes against the principle of equality.133 To be
considered an objective criterion that can justify a
potential unequal treatment, the criterion must be
impersonal and must be based on ascertainable facts
rather than on sentiment or prejudices.134 Although
paraphrased, this definition of the principle of equality
also applies in the Netherlands.
In Belgian court decisions and literature, it is
acknowledged that tax-levying governments may also
use their tax competence for non-fiscal purposes (for
instance, objectives with an economic, social, aesthetic
or environmental purpose). However, the main objec-
tive of the tax must always be of a fiscal nature. This
refers to the budgetary function of the tax or the fact
that the reason for or the level of taxation is related to,
for example, the magnitude of the costs, the financial
capacity of the people involved or the advantages
received.135
As Belgian general municipal taxes have a purely bud-
getary purpose, it will not be possible to limit these taxes
to only a specific part of the local authorities’ territory, as
no justification of such unequal treatment exists. Why
should a person from one part of the town pay more than
another if the municipal tax applies to all and is justified
only by budgetary reasons?
For other types of taxes, such as destination-based
taxes for services rendered in a specific part of the
local territory, territorial differentiation is possible.
Additional, non-fiscal objectives could provide
justification for unequal treatment of taxpayers. These
will have to be explicitly expressed by the municipal
tax authorities to allow testing of the differentiation
against the sought after non-fiscal purpose. The motives
behind these objectives must be observable (which the
dossier can prove), they must be correct (they must
correspond to reality) and finally they must be ‘load
bearing’ (they must effectively justify the decision).136
An example of a territorially differentiated taxation in
Belgium, is the destination-based tax for the construc-
tion and equipment of roads, sewers, footpaths etc. It is
a direct tax meant to recover the costs of those services,
from the owners of adjoining property, who are consid-
ered to irrefutably benefit from this particular service.
This levy can be characterized between general taxes
and fees and shows a lot of similarity with the Dutch
betterment levy (see below). This tax will apply only to
owners of property adjoining roads where equipment
was installed, and can therefore be described as territo-
rially limited. One significant difference with the
Dutch situation, however, is that in Belgium the desti-
nation-based tax must apply to the entire local author-
ity: if similar works are carried out in another part of
the territory of this same local authority, this tax will
necessarily also apply there.
4.3.2.2 Territorial Differentiation in
the Netherlands
The Dutch betterment levy has been formulated by
law so that it can be limited to a specific part of the
local territory. The betterment levy regulation applies
only to the indicated served area. The decision to
introduce a betterment levy to recover construction
costs for particular facilities and to apply this to the
benefiting property only applies to this area. If similar
provisions are made in other parts of the local author-
ity, the Dutch local authority is – unlike Belgian local
authorities – not legally required to introduce a simi-
lar betterment levy. In Belgium, not introducing a
betterment levy in another part of the local authority
whilst concerning similar facilities, would be consid-
ered arbitrary and thus in conflict with the principle
of equality. This difference between Belgium and the
Netherlands is a direct result of the respectively open
Notes
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and closed states of their tax systems. If the possibility
of unequal treatment has been deliberately enshrined
in law by the national legislature, Dutch courts seem
to consider themselves unable to oppose this at a later
stage. In the Belgian situation, however, where the tax
system is not legally enshrined, the principle of equal-
ity applies without limits to the entire municipal
territory.
Another Dutch example of a creative approach to
the closed system concerns the introduction of an
advertising tax in only a portion of the local author-
ity’s territory. It is accepted in case law that this
tax – classified as a general tax – may be limited by
a particular local authority to a portion of its territory,
provided this has an objective and reasonable
justification.137 As a local authority may also choose
how to spend the proceeds of a general tax, these
proceeds moreover may be spent on activities and
provisions within a specific area of its territory. This
freedom means that many Dutch local authorities levy
an advertising tax only within the (shopping) centre
area, while the proceeds are recycled as subsidies for
taxpaying entrepreneurs. It is then up to those entre-
preneurs to spend the proceeds on joint activities or
provisions within the shopping district. This practice
is referred to in the Netherlands as entrepreneurial
funds and is somewhat similar to business improve-
ment districts in the United Kingdom and the United
States. Within the courts decisions, there is considered
to be an objective and reasonable justification behind
the limitation of taxation to the shopping centre area,
if the local authority can reasonably assume that those
who would profit from the proceeds of this taxation
are also subject to the levying thereof.138
Consequently, more freedom for local authorities also
exists here in the closed system of tax levying, than
would be possible in the open Belgian system due to
the limited scope of the principle of equality.
4.3.3 The Recognition of Fiscal Principles: Tax
Freedom for Public Goods
4.3.3.1. Tax Freedom for Public Goods in
Belgium
A last peculiarity of the Belgian open municipal tax
system is the manifestly easier recognition of fiscal prin-
ciples limiting the fiscal authority. Exemplary is the
principle of tax freedom for public goods, which means that
goods of the actual government,139 of the public domain
or of the private domain but intended for public utility
are exempted from municipal and provincial taxes.
Until 1881, the highest courts of justice of Belgium
shared the opinion that the state, even for its public domain
goods, was subject to municipal taxes, because there was not
any law granting a tax exemption.140 Soon afterwards, the
Supreme Court assembled in United Chambers recognized
the principle of tax freedom of the state.141 The dispute
concerned the possibility for the city of Brussels to tax the
construction of several public buildings, including the
‘palace of justice’, the most important court building in
Belgium. After the Court of First Instance authorized the
tax exemption in first instance,142 the Court of Appeal
altered the decision in taxability143 and finally, the
Supreme Court decided for the first time that municipal
tax freedom of the state for public goods is a general
principle.144 However, the Court of Appeal in Ghent – to
which the case was referred – did not accept this view, and
decided in favour of the tax levied by the city of Brussels.
A second decision by the United Chambers of the
Supreme Court – which made the verdict binding for all
other courts – reconfirmed the principle of tax freedom.145
The principle of tax freedom for state goods of the public
domain and for goods of the private domain but intended
for public use has been confirmed many times in subse-
quent years,146 and is still applied today.147 It was even
recently reconfirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision
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of 23 February 2018.148 However, for certain taxes (such
as vacancy taxes), the exemption for public goods is being
questioned by some courts.149
4.3.3.2. No Tax Freedom for Public Goods in
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, no such municipal tax freedom for
public goods exists. In principle, ‘own’ municipal institu-
tions are taxable and all public buildings are valued on the
basis of the WOZ (National Law on Assessment of Real
Estate). A remarkable example is the valuation of the
Royal Palace Huis ten Bosch, one of the palaces of the
formal queen in The Hague.150 Other governments, like
the state, the province and the water board, may be
subject to municipal taxes, as well. However, concerning
the WOZ, several valuation exemptions for real estate are
applicable, of which no value need be assessed. Such
immovable property often are owned by the aforemen-
tioned governments. Amongst others, these are nature
reserves, public land-, water- and railways, works for
defending and managing water (such as dykes and pump-
ing stations) and works for depolluting waste treatment.
It should also be mentioned, that although the local
authority is taxable for its own taxes, this does not mean
the taxes are actually being collected. To prevent admin-
istrative costs, local authorities are allowed to omit impos-
ing and collecting tax assessments in this case.
This example shows again the bigger tax autonomy of
Dutch local authorities over the Belgian local authorities.
5 CONCLUSION
This article has analysed the freedom of Dutch and
Belgian local authorities to levy taxes. The most striking
difference between these two countries is a closed system
versus an open system through own taxes. The authors
conclude that an ‘open system’, whereby the exceptions on
fiscal competence are relatively comprehensive, does not
necessarily have to be more autonomous than a closed
system, where a broad interpretation of the taxes exhaus-
tively described by law is accepted.
Dutch local authorities may levy taxes only if explicitly
mentioned so in the law. Except for some specific regulations
and general principles of proper legislation, local authorities
in the Netherlands may choose the tax base themselves.
There is no preventive supervision of the tax regulation
before the introduction of a tax. Taxpayers do not have
remedies against the municipal tax regulation itself;
administrative appeal and appeal is possible only after receiv-
ing a tax assessment. When reviewing the tax assessment,
however, courts may examine whether the municipal tax
regulation, and/or the execution thereof, complies with the
legal terms laid down in the Local Authorities Law, the
Constitution, general principles of law and treaties.
Belgian local authorities can levy any tax they want,
except for some legal exceptions, administrative
approval and respect of general fiscal principles. This
open system has led to the existence of well over 100
different municipal taxes. Judicial control takes place
on three levels: the individual assessment, the tax reg-
ulation and the Constitutionality of the legal provi-
sions. Furthermore, the number of principles that
bounds the tax autonomy in Belgium is broader than
in the Netherlands. These principles do also have a
wider reach.
Both in the Netherlands and in Belgium there is, in
judicial review as well as in practice, a distinction made
between taxes and fees. Destination-based taxes form an
intermediate category of charges. The distinction between
taxes, destination-based taxes and fees has a different impor-
tance in both countries. In the Netherlands, there is a stricter
separation, while the distinction is more flexible in Belgium.
In Belgium, it is possible to transform a fee into a tax. After
this ‘fiscalizing’, Belgian local authorities gain access to the
formal tax legislation to enforce the payment of charges for
rendered services, such as investigation powers and penalties,
which can’t be used for fees.
In the Dutch system, the only way to design a fee as a
tax is when the national legislature changes the character
of the fee. However, it is possible, and this happens often
in practice, that a general tax is introduced by local
authorities as a destination-based tax: the revenue is des-
tined for a specific target and the taxation is based on a
presumed group profit. Moreover, in the Netherlands the
same collecting and taxation powers apply for both taxes
and fees. However, the judicial control between those
levies are different in the Netherlands. Especially fees
have a comprehensively judicial examination. It can also
be concluded that the strict distinction between the levies
and the way judicial control happens in the Netherlands,
are the direct result of the closed system and the legal
regulations of the distinguished levies. The higher degree
of flexibility for Belgian local authorities is the result of
the open system that applies there.
Nevertheless, at some points there is more freedom in
the closed Dutch system than in the open Belgian system.
In this article, this is illustrated on the basis of three
situations:
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- Regarding levying municipal taxes based on income,
revenue and/or gross profit, it seems that the closed
Dutch system is more flexible than the open Belgian
system. In Dutch jurisprudence, a distinction is made
between a direct and indirect connection with income
or profit. No conflict with the prohibition to levy
taxes based on financial capacity exists if a levy is
based on the gross profit. In Belgium however, such
a levy is considered to be in violation of the
prohibition.
- The second example, about the possibilities for local
authorities to differentiate with their taxes within the
territory, shows again that local authorities have more
freedom in the Netherlands. This is on the one hand
because the main objective of the tax must be of a
fiscal nature in Belgium, and on the other hand
because of the reach of the principle of equality.
Territorial restricted taxes will therefore be considered
illegal if another part of the territory is in the same
circumstances. In the Netherlands, the principle of
equality has a more limited scope, and a levy can be
limited to a specific part of the local territory on
multiple occasions.
- The open Belgian system is among other things lim-
ited as to the result of specific tax principles. One of
these fiscal principles is the tax freedom of public
goods. Such a principle – and the resulting restriction
of the local authorities’ tax autonomy– does not exist
in the Netherlands.
Overall, the difference between the two systems appears
to be much more subtle than one might expect at first
glance. In the Belgian open system, municipal tax auton-
omy appears to be constrained in a comprehensive manner,
because of limitations in laws and preventive and judicial
scrutiny at various levels. Regarding the more substantive
provisions, the Belgian municipal taxation system has been
widely constrained by general principles of tax law. In the
Netherlands, the opposite is true. The closed system shows
a limited number of constraints as regards to judicial
scrutiny in comparison to the Belgian situation. Remedies
against the tax regulation itself do not exist; nor is the tax
regulation preventively being assessed at a higher level.
Less principles of tax law apply, and those that do have
less far reaching consequences than in Belgium.
This study was exploratory by nature, because the
municipal tax autonomy of only two countries within
the European Union was compared. Further research is
needed to determine whether the authors’ findings can be
extrapolated to other Member States who are operating
systems of open or closed tax competence.
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